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Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages: 
Key Elasticities from a Stripped-Down Job Search Approach 
 
This paper exploits survey information on reservation wages and data on actual wages from 
the European Community Household Panel to deduce in the manner of Lancaster and 
Chesher (1983) additional parameters of a stylized structural search model; specifically, 
reservation wage and transition/duration elasticities. The informational requirements of this 
approach are minimal, thereby facilitating comparisons between countries. Further, its policy 
content is immediate insofar as the impact of unemployment benefit rules and measures 
increasing the arrival rate of job offers are concerned. These key elasticities are computed for 
the United Kingdom and eleven other European nations. 
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 Introduction
In this paper we calculate four key elasticities that are centrally related to unem-
ployment duration, using information on asking wages and expected wages from an
international data set. Following Lancaster and Chesher’s (1983) seminal treat-
ment, these elasticities are derived analytically rather than formally estimated.
The four elasticities in question are: (a) the elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to the levelof unemploymentbeneﬁts; (b) the elasticityof reservation wages
with respect to the rate of job oﬀers; (c) the probability of reemploymentelasticity
(or unemployment duration elasticity) with respect to the level of unemployment
beneﬁts; and (d) the probability of reemployment elasticity (or unemployment du-
ration elasticity) with respect to the rate of job oﬀers. The data set used is the
European Community Household Panel, 1994-99, covering all of the (then) ﬁfteen
nations of the European Union (but see below).
Use of Lancaster and Chesher’s ingenious approach allows us to make inferences
about the behaviour of unemployed job seekers with only minimal information
requirements and without the methodological limitations of empirical/regression
models. Further, it sidesteps statistical problems associated with the modelling
of unobserved individual heterogeneity and true state dependence that are en-
countered with formal structural models, while yet having a basis in a stylized
structural model. Tradeoﬀs are of course implied by parsimony. That said, there
are no such tradeoﬀs on the data front: the breadth of our sample considerably
expands the number of countries for which consistent structural parameters can
be provided. The inferences drawn about the behaviour of unemployed job seekers
also have clear policy content, most notably with respect to unemployment bene-
ﬁt rules and policies that may increase the arrival rate of job oﬀers by increasing
search intensity (e.g. outplacement, active search requirements, and job search
assistance).
In what follows, we ﬁrst set down the barebones of the optimal search model
and the speciﬁc solutions provided by Lancaster and Chesher. Second, we describe
the data set and the ﬁnal sample of countries. Third, we present the reservation
1wage and duration elasticities, together with a robustness check. Finally, we brieﬂy
summarize our ﬁndings.
I. The Stationary Optimal Search Model and Solution Formulae
Assuming income-maximizing workers, inﬁnite lives, unemployment beneﬁts and
jobs (once accepted), sampling without recall, and wage oﬀers that are independent
realizations of the random variable w whose distribution function is F(w), the
optimal reservation wage - equating the costs and beneﬁts of continued search -
may be written:





(w − ξ)dF(w)( 1 )
where b is the (constant) amount of unemployment beneﬁts net of any search costs,
ρ is the discount rate, w is the wage oﬀer, λ is the arrival rate of job oﬀers, and
F(w) is the cumulative wage oﬀer distribution.
Abstracting from the discount rate (since it disappears from the integrated
formulation of the optimality condition) and, for the moment, the mean of the oﬀer
distribution, diﬀerentiation of equation (1) with respect to b and λ will give the
responsiveness of the reservation wage to unemployment beneﬁts and the arrival
rate of job oﬀers. (As a practical matter, we shall assume that job oﬀers are
generated by a Poisson process and, in the discrete time case, arrive with constant
probability in each period, ruling out the need for actual information on the arrival
rate.) Similarly, diﬀerentiating the reemployment probability or hazard rate θ =
λ[1 − F(ξ)] with respect to b and λ, will yield the response of the reemployment
probability or unemployment duration (since a speciﬁcation of the hazard function
is equivalent to a speciﬁcation of the distribution of unemployment duration) to
unemployment beneﬁts and the arrival rate of job oﬀers.
Lancaster and Chesher note that if we have information on the mean of the
distribution of acceptable wage oﬀers, x[= E(w|w ≥ ξ)],1 as well as data for b,
λ (but see above) and ξ, we can obtain all the above derivatives. But converting
the derivatives into elasticities for the probability of reemployment (with respect
2to beneﬁts and the arrival rate of job oﬀers) requires making some assumption as
to the shape of the relevant portion of the wage oﬀer distribution (i.e. exceeding
the beneﬁts level), or more precisely the hazard function of the oﬀer distribution
at the selected reservation wage,
f(ξ)
1−F(ξ). Lancaster and Chesher choose the Pareto
distribution allowing them to compute the hazard as 1
σξ,w h e r eσ corresponds to
the standard deviation of log wage oﬀers.
The precise solutions obtained by Lancaster and Chesher permitting calculation
of each elasticity are given in Table 1. After Lynch (1983), we also provide the
solutions assuming an exponential distribution for the relevant portion of the oﬀer
distribution.
(Table 1 near here)
II. The Data
We are aware of only two previous studies using data on x, b,a n dξ to deduce
the structural parameters in Table 1, namely, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) and
Lynch (1983) who each use British data. Lancaster and Chesher use data on 642
workers collected in a national survey for Political and Economic Planning in 1974.
Lynch uses data from two samples of 70 and 53 unemployed individuals who were
actively looking for work in 1980 - from an initial sample of a little under 2,000
young persons in London who were planning to leave school in the summer of 1979.
By contrast, we use information from six waves of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), 1994-99. The ECHP is a survey based on a standard-
ized questionnaire administered annually to a representative panel of households
and individuals.2 In 1994, for example, some 60,500 such households or a lit-
tle over 130,000 adults aged 16 years and above were interviewed. Comparable
information is provided for 15 countries. We use data for 12 of the countries: Ger-
many, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Austria. The three excluded countries are
Luxembourg and Sweden where is not possible to follow individuals through time,
and Finland where there is no information on monthly unemployment beneﬁts.
3With some exceptions, the data cover the entire period. The main exceptions are
Germany and the United Kingdom where we include data from just the 1994-96
waves because of missing data on hourly reservation wages and data on job oﬀers,
respectively, in the parent surveys conducted after 1996.3
The key pieces of information directly contained in the ECHP that are used
in the present inquiry are reservation wages and unemployment beneﬁts. Unlike
Lancaster and Chesher we do not have information on expected wages, but as we
shall see we can use the ECHP to estimate this magnitude from other information
in the dataset.
Beginning with reservation wages, each individual actively looking for a job
is asked two questions pertaining ﬁrst to desired hours of work and second to
the minimum income required to work these hours. The actual questions are:
‘Assuming you could ﬁnd suitable work, how many hours per week would you
prefer to work in this new job?’ and ‘What is the minimum net monthly income
would you accept to work [number of hours in previous question] hours a week in
this new job?’4
The data on unemployment beneﬁts contained in the ECHP is with one ex-
ception a monthly measure. It is comparable to the Lancaster-Chesher measure
of unemployment income but, as is the case for all our variables, is provided in
continuous rather than categorical form.
Although the ECHP does not contain information on expected wages, we were
nevertheless able to compute an expected wage for each unemployed worker using
the empirical distribution of wages of the contemporaneously employed population
who had found a job in the survey year. Speciﬁcally, at survey date we matched
each unemployed individual with his/her counterpart in the recently employed
population. The matching was on the basis of two gender, ﬁve age, and three
education categories.5
Each unemployed individual was therefore assigned to one of 30 cells and at-
tributed the average monthly earnings of that cell, subject to the latter being at
least equal to the matched unemployed individual’s reservation wage. Our device
4of using information on current starting wages to proxy the wage oﬀer distribu-
tion faced by the currently unemployed may be superior to the construct used by
Lancaster and Chesher. This is because it is based on convincing information on
the relevant wage oﬀer distribution and is computed in a way that corresponds
precisely to the theorectical notion of conditional (on reservation wages) expected
wages.
Figure 1 provides the resulting density functions of expected wages for each
country. Also included in the ﬁgure are the corresponding unemployment beneﬁts
and reservation wage densities. The expectedwage distribution is, by construction,
displaced to the right of the reservation wage distribution.6
(Figure 1 near here)
As a check, we shall also provide results for a sample in which the expected
wage is derived on the basis of the unemployed individual’s subsequent reemploy-
ment wage (i.e. at following survey wave). Deﬁning expected wages in this manner
could be an attractive alternative in a rational expectations sense. The problem is
that the sample is much reduced because only a minority of those workers unem-
ployed at ﬁnds work. Moreover, imposition of the restriction that accepted wages
exceed not only unemployment beneﬁts but, more importantly, the reservation
wage resulted in a further large reduction - of around 40 percent - in sample size.
Before presenting our ﬁndings, we need to address the quality of our data and
their adequacy for an analysis of reservation wages in particular. Principally,
although past studies suﬀer from a potential problem of low response rates to the
reservation wage question, this is not a consideration with the present dataset since
response rates exceed 90 percent. Further, the restriction that reservation wages
exceed unemployment beneﬁts is also generally met in the data (see Addison et
al., 2004).
III. Findings
The procedure of Lancaster and Chesher generates elasticity values for each indi-
vidual in the sample. Misreporting, measurement error, and division by numbers
5close to zero may result in some aberrant elastiticies (or outliers) which may cor-
rupt the computation of sample means. In order to avoid the undesirable contam-
ination from extreme values, we computed median elasticities. 7
The computed median elasticities and the corresponding bootstrap standard
deviations are contained in Table 2. Panel (a) of the table gives results for the
unrestricted sample, while panel (b) imposes the theoretical restriction of the sta-
tionary model that the reservation wage should exceed the beneﬁt level. As can
be seen, the restriction results in some loss of observations (most especially for
the Netherlands) but the results are broadly comparable as between panels, with
greater variabilityfor the transition elasticitieswith respect to unemployment ben-
eﬁts in panel (b). In what follows we will focus on the restricted sample, while
entering the caveat that the theoretical restriction may not necessarily be always
appropriate; for example, where beneﬁts are ﬁnite, the reservation wage may in-
deed fall below the beneﬁt level.
(Table 2 near here)
It is apparent that the reservation wage elasticities are comparatively small,
falling within the range 0.107 to 0.427 for the beneﬁt elasticity of reservation
wages and 0.109 to 0.260 in the case of the oﬀer probability elasticity of reserva-
tion wages. For their part, the transition elasticities can be large. As a case in
point, assuming a Pareto (Exponential) distribution for the relevant portion of the
wage oﬀer distribution, a 10 per cent increase in beneﬁt levels is associated with a
18.4 (14.3) per cent fall in escape rates for Denmark where the highest disincentive
eﬀects are observed. For the Pareto tail, three out of twelve transition elastici-
ties exceed unity. As far as the eﬀect of job oﬀers on transition probabilities is
concerned, however, the elasticities are more closely clustered across nations and
more so in the case of the Exponential than the Pareto distribution. Observe that
the net eﬀect of an increase in the probability of an oﬀer on escape rates is always
positive, meaning that the eﬀect on asking wages is dominated by the eﬀects of
more oﬀers. Note, ﬁnally, that the elasticities are estimated with considerable
precision.8
6(Table 3 near here)
It is interesting to compare in Table 3 our ﬁndings for the United Kingdom with
those obtained by Lancaster and Chesher (1983, pp. 1668, 1671) for all workers
and also by Lynch (1983, p. 277) for school leavers. Note that in order to eﬀect
these comparisons we are here using mean rather than median elasticities. A full
set of mean elasticities corresponding to those given in Table 2 is provided in Ap-
pendix Table 1. Given the diﬀerences in years and samples, the range within which
the estimates fall is fairly narrow, but only for the eﬀect of beneﬁts on transition
probabilities is there close correspondence between our results and those of Lan-
caster and Chesher (Pareto distribution) and Lynch (Exponential distribution).
As far as the results for other countries are concerned, there are few points of
comparison as most studies pertain to the United States where estimates of the
four elasticities lie below those reported in the table (a summary of these studies
is provided in Devine and Kiefer, 1991). But evidence on the elasticity of the
reservation wage with respect to beneﬁts provided by Ridder and Gorter (1986) in
a structural model for the Netherlands (0.450) closely resembles the corresponding
estimate for that country in Appendix Table 1 (0.464).9
(Table 4 near here)
In Table 4 we calculate a set of elasticities that parallel those reported in Table
2 but this time using information on the same individual over sequential surveys.
That is, we consider individuals who are unemployed at time t but employed at
time t + 1. The estimate of the unemployed individual’s expected wage is now
his/her accepted wage, subject to the reemployment wage not only exceeding the
beneﬁt level but also the stated reservation wage. Necessarily, the sample is much
reduced because only a minority of unemployed individuals go on to report a wage
at t+1 - the majority remain unemployed and yet others become inactive. But the
results in Table 4 do not produce any shocks in the form of perverse elasticities. In
this sense our main ﬁndings pass a crude robustness check. Nevertheless, although
estimates of the two reservation wage elasticities again conform to a fairly narrow
band, they are generally lower than before. The transition elasticities with respect
7to the arrival rate of job oﬀers also fall within a fairly narrow range and are again
somewhat smaller (under both assumptions as to the tail of the distribution) than
before. Major diﬀerences do, however, characterize the transition elasticities with
respect to unemployment beneﬁts. As is evident, the absolute values reported for
each distribution now almost always exceed the previous values.
IV. Conclusions
In an ingenious paper, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) used survey data on unem-
ployed persons in the United Kingdom and economic theory to deduce (rather
than estimate via a formal statistical model) the structural parameters of the sta-
tionary optimal search model. We have followed their methodology - although our
treatment diﬀers from theirs in the manner of the derivation of the mean of the
distribution of acceptable wage oﬀers - to obtain updated estimates of reserva-
tion wage and transition elasticities for the United Kingdom and for eleven other
European nations as well. Our ﬁndings, which are numerically consistent with
the theory, are found to be robust with respect to an alternative deﬁnition of the
expected wage and hence conﬁguration of the data. Moreover, our preferred es-
timates closely accord with those provided by Lancaster and Chesher using U.K.
data for 1984.
We are unaware of any other consistently estimated cross-country ﬁndings.
Given the policy content of the elasticities with respect to unemployment, and
subject to further corroboration of at least some of the individual country ﬁnd-
ings, suggestive lines of future inquiry might include investigating whether varia-
tion in the ’indicative’ estimates is associated with the generosity of a country’s
unemployment beneﬁt system or with the stringency of its employment protection
regime.
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8Notes
1Lancaster and Chesher (1983) interpret answers to the question ‘How much take-home pay would you expect
to earn in a new job?’as revealing this magnitude.
2The actual data cover the interval January 1993 through December 1998 as the questions in each survey
pertaining to labour market experience relate to the preceding calendar year. The ECHP covers a very wide
range of topics apart from the individual’s economic activity and income, including health, education, housing,
pensions and insurance, and social relations (see, for example, EUROSTAT, 1999).
3Information on the reservation wage is unavailable for the Netherlands in 1994 and 1995.
4This reservation wage variable was duly deﬂated by the relevant national consumer price index, as were all
nominal arguments.
5 The schooling categories identify basic, secondary, and tertiary education. The ﬁve age groups correspond
to the following intervals: 17-25 years; 26-35 years; 36-45 years; 46-55 years; and 56-65 years.
6Because the unemployment beneﬁts are highly concentrated for Ireland and the U.K. we introduce a second
vertical scale in the graphs of the densities for these two countries
7Simple sample averages are provided in Appendix Tables 1 and 2
8The bootstrapstandarddeviationswere obtainedfrom 200 replications. Using the more conventionalstandard
error of the mean formulae, gives identical results.
9However, other results for the Netherlands(cited in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 157) are less conformable.
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10Table 1: The Elasticity Measures and Their Solution
Elasticity Notation Solution
Reservation Wage w.r.t. the Beneﬁt Level ηξ,b
bx−ξ
ξx−b









Reemployment Probability w.r.t. the Beneﬁt Level, Exponential Assumption ηθ,b − b
x−b





Reemployment Probability w.r.t the Rate of Job Oﬀers, Exponential Assumption ηθ,λ 1 −
ξ−b
x−b




 MEDIAN BENEFIT AND OFFER PROBABILITY ELASTICITIES OF RESERVATION WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION BY COUNTRY, 1993-98
Country/Elasticity Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium France U.K. Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria
(a)   No sample restrictions
 ηξ, b 0.271 0.416 0.618 0.166 0.247 0.194 0.199 0.133 0.109 0.333 0.317 0.300
(0.010) (0.014) (0.079) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024)
ηξ, λ 0.168 0.094 0.097 0.130 0.180 0.225 0.188 0.114 0.156 0.128 0.127 0.149
(0.004) (0.003) (0.019) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -0.994 -2.000 -1.602 -835.000 -0.868 -0.531 -0.838 -0.925 -0.645 -1.455 -1.448 -1.271
(0.023) (0.065) (0.111) (0.048) (0.022) (0.034) (0.038) (0.078) (0.017) (0.035) (0.047) (0.070)
ηθ,λ 0.278 0.416 0.619 0.174 0.248 0.195 0.203 0.141 0.111 0.338 0.326 0.307
(0.010) (0.014) (0.068) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.027)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -0.670 -1.500 -0.864 -0.579 -0.580 -0.284 -0.600 -0.715 -0.504 -1.063 -1.089 -0.910
(0.016) (0.055) (0.074) (0.026) (0.012) (0.007) (0.030) (0.079) (0.023) (0.029) (0.045) (0.046)
ηθ,λ 0.492 0.541 0.777 0.349 0.493 0.534 0.439 0.291 0.277 0.511 0.480 0.503
(0.014) (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) (0.007) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.032)
n 941 659 156 684 1675 398 260 193 283 1055 420 177
(b) Restriction:  reservation wage > unemployment benefits
 ηξ, b 0.250 0.328 0.427 0.163 0.231 0.150 0.189 0.157 0.107 0.298 0.390 0.274
(0.010) (0.013) (0.041) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020)
ηξ, λ 0.180 0.109 0.172 0.141 0.188 0.260 0.192 0.117 0.156 0.138 0.135 0.155
(0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -0.961 -1.839 -1.258 -0.787 -0.824 -0.426 -0.826 -0.993 -0.645 -1.355 -1.426 -1.203
(0.027) (0.072) (0.127) (0.043) (0.018) (0.016) (0.044) (0.071) (0.017) (0.036) (0.044) (0.059)
ηθ,λ 0.255 0.333 0.431 0.165 0.233 0.151 0.189 0.161 0.111 0.300 0.313 0.277
(0.008) (0.015) (0.044) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.021)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -0.645 -1.429 -0.721 -0.559 -0.561 -0.266 -0.577 -0.788 -0.509 -0.995 -1.066 -0.861
(0.014) (0.047) (0.042) (0.025) (0.011) (0.006) (0.027) (0.073) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040) (0.044)
ηθ,λ 0.465 0.473 0.682 0.341 0.473 0.464 0.417 0.316 0.276 0.474 0.474 0.453
(0.009) (0.016) (0.034) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.034)
n 835 590 107 630 1531 319 250 161 279 942 392 154
 
Source
European Community Household Panel, 1994-99
Note
Bootstrap standard deviations in parenthesis Table 3: A Comparison of Results for the United Kingdom
Lancaster and Chesher Lynch ECHP
ηξ,b 0.135 0.106 0.237
ηξ,λ 0.107 0.146 0.251
ηθ,b (Pareto) -1.030 -0.483 -0.873
ηθ,b (Exponential) - -0.559 -0.502
ηθ,λ (Pareto) 0.190 0.298 0.399
ηθ,λ (Exponential) - 0.252 0.496
13Table 4
MEDIAN BENEFIT AND OFFER PROBABILITY ELASTICITIES OF RESERVATION WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION BY COUNTRY, USING ACTUAL ACCEPTED WAGES, 1993-98
Country/Elasticity Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium France U.K. Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria
Restriction:  reservation wage > unemployment benefits and reservation wages < accepted wages
 ηξ, b 0.179 0.327 0.213 0.091 0.156 0.212 0.160 0.100 0.148 0.284 0.237 0.327
(0.021) (0.030) (0.091) (0.020) (0.022) (0.036) (0.035) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.047) (0.035)
ηξ, λ 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.066 0.068 0.106 0.125 0.079 0.200 0.059 0.041 0.072
(0.008) (0.005) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -1.321 -2.636 -1.614 -0.991 -1.225 -0.617 -1.042 -1.067 -0.750 -1.912 -2.190 -2.027
(0.092) (0.214) (0.427) (0.168) (0.277) (0.044) (0.166) (0.156) (0.027) (0.126) (0.275) (0.209)
ηθ,λ 0.201 0.393 0.331 0.135 0.207 0.212 0.166 0.147 0.158 0.375 0.318 0.346
(0.016) (0.032) (0.091) (0.013) (0.021) (0.038) (0.037) (0.017) (0.001) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -1.143 -2.214 -0.945 -0.775 -1.062 -0.380 -0.795 -0.565 -0.556 -1.600 -1.689 -1.500
(0.075) (0.166) (0.216) (0.110) (0.254) (0.024) (0.143) (0.132) (0.053) (0.098) (0.248) (0.184)
ηθ,λ 0.278 0.429 0.316 0.218 0.303 0.515 0.342 0.200 0.364 0.455 0.374 0.510
(0.023) (0.033) (0.100) (0.031) (0.030) (0.044) (0.047) (0.021) (0.044) (0.026) (0.045) (0.061)
n 129 115 24 60 120 59 45 27 32 153 50 25
Source
European Community Household Panel, 1994-9  
Note
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Figure1(continued): Unemployment benefits, reservation wages and expected wages 
 Appendix Table 1 
 AVERAGE BENEFIT AND OFFER PROBABILITY ELASTICITIES OF RESERVATION WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION BY COUNTRY, 1993-98
Country/Elasticity Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium France U.K. Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria
(a)   No sample restrictions
 ηξ, b 0.420 0.657 1.030 0.299 0.402 0.612 0.297 0.189 0.140 0.499 0.383 0.340
(0.024) (0.036) (0.144) (0.021) (0.012) (0.053) (0.015) (0.046) (0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.038)
ηξ, λ 0.134 0.008 0.100 0.115 0.151 0.229 0.173 0.128 0.163 0.095 0.123 0.296
(0.009) (0.018) (0.065) (0.008) (0.005) (0.034) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -1.395 -2.295 -2.111 -1.241 -1.272 -1.220 -0.920 -0.922 -0.714 -1.791 -1.772 -1.342
(0.093) (0.120) (0.303) (0.085) (0.042) (0.097) (0.050) (0.215) (0.032) (0.067) (0.064) (0.190)
ηθ,λ 0.556 0.973 1.205 0.520 0.523 0.954 0.462 0.374 0.173 0.658 0.432 0.697
(0.031) (0.073) (0.146) (0.043) (0.018) (0.065) (0.016) (0.052) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.078)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -0.942 -2.097 -1.605 -0.936 -0.835 -0.358 -0.753 -0.718 -0.547 -1.421 -1.470 -1.092
(0.056) (0.080) (0.255) (0.048) (0.022) (0.012) (0.038) (0.197) (0.015) (0.049) (0.060) (0.066)
ηθ,λ 0.554 0.658 0.942 0.410 0.549 0.635 0.476 0.320 0.306 0.592 0.506 0.607
(0.180) (0.024) (0.094) (0.015) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.036) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.054)
n 941 659 156 684 1675 398 260 193 283 1055 420 177
(b) Restriction:  reservation wage > unemployment benefits
 ηξ, b 0.296 0.366 0.464 0.214 0.292 0.237 0.263 0.226 0.136 0.349 0.342 0.311
(0.008) (0.010) (0.028) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
ηξ, λ 0.181 0.112 0.174 0.151 0.192 0.251 0.182 0.129 0.163 0.141 0.138 0.155
(0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -0.981 -1.279 -0.952 -0.887 -0.725 -0.873 -0.815 -0.701 -0.690 -1.254 -1.584 -0.838
(0.025) (0.030) (0.050) (0.035) (0.016) (0.026) (0.041) (0.074) (0.033) (0.025) (0.050) (0.039)
ηθ,λ 0.398 0.610 0.443 0.374 0.392 0.399 0.434 0.372 0.174 0.493 0.361 0.581
(0.010) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.025) (0.029) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -0.785 -0.752 -0.807 -0.880 -0.519 -0.502 -0.681 -0.535 -0.549 -1.169 -1.362 -0.998
(0.016) (0.051) (0.094) (0.031) (0.012) (0.010) (0.027) (0.076) (0.014) (0.025) (0.050) (0.044)
ηθ,λ 0.470 0.481 0.448 0.369 0.489 0.496 0.451 0.358 0.301 0.494 0.483 0.469
(0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
n 835 590 107 630 1531 319 250 161 279 942 392 154
 
Source
European Community Household Panel, 1994-99
Note
Bootstrap standard deviations in parenthesisAppendix Table 2
AVERAGE BENEFIT AND OFFER PROBABILITY ELASTICITIES OF RESERVATION WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION BY COUNTRY, USING ACTUAL ACCEPTED WAGES, 1993-98
Country/Elasticity Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium France U.K. Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria
Restriction:  reservation wage > unemployment benefits and reservation wages < accepted wages
 ηξ, b 0.237 0.385 0.385 0.139 0.230 0.227 0.227 0.156 0.187 0.349 0.348 0.240
(0.019) (0.027) (0.078) (0.017) (0.023) (0.039) (0.032) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.045) (0.029)
ηξ, λ 0.109 0.079 0.087 0.109 0.103 0.198 0.131 0.120 0.182 0.113 0.095 0.126
(0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Pareto distribution
ηθ,b -1.660 -1.828 -0.959 -1.254 -1.006 -0.587 -1.310 -1.229 -0.735 -2.011 -1.709 -1.509
(0.090) (0.172) (0.350) (0.160) (0.275) (0.054) (0.163) (0.159) (0.043) (0.115) (0.281) (0.189)
ηθ,λ 0.240 0.389 0.329 0.143 0.232 0.227 0.233 0.164 0.193 0.356 0.358 0.255
(0.018) (0.025) (0.068) (0.018) (0.023) (0.040) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.024)
Exponential distribution
ηθ,b -1.328 -1.631 -1.363 -1.013 -1.082 -0.362 -1.051 -0.874 -0.630 -1.736 -1.353 -1.505
(0.077) (0.170) (0.268) (0.116) (0.255) (0.028) (0.143) (0.135) (0.042) (0.095) (0.258) (0.184)
ηθ,λ 0.351 0.467 0.413 0.258 0.337 0.436 0.364 0.258 0.378 0.467 0.449 0.394
(0.022) (0.026) (0.089) (0.025) (0.027) (0.044) (0.034) (0.023) (0.042) (0.025) (0.039) (0.042)
n 129 115 24 60 120 59 45 27 32 153 50 25
Source
European Community Household Panel, 1994-99
Note
Bootstrap standard deviations in parenthesis